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THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS DRUNK
DRIVING ROADBLOCKS
People v. Bartley
109 Ill. 2d 273, 486 N.E.2d 880 (1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1384 (1986)
INTRODUCTION

Drunk drivers kill and injure thousands of people every year. I In an
effort to reduce the slaughter, the states have stepped up enforcement of
drunk driving laws, increased the minimum drinking age, 2 and increased
the penalties for those convicted. 3 One controversial action taken by the
1. See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558-59 (1983); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1,
17 n.9 (1979); State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 8, 663 P.2d 992, 999 (1983); People
v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 285-86, 486 N.E.2d 880, 885-86 (1985) (quoting National Transportation
Safety Board Study), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1384 (1986); Commonwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81,
86-87, 483 N.E.2d 1102, 1105-06 (1985); H.R. REP. No. 867, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in
1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3367, 3367; Note, Curbing the Drunk Driver Under the Fourth
Amendment The Constitutionalityof Roadblock Seizures, 71 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1457 n.1 (1983).
While the term drunk driving is used throughout this comment, states refer to drunk driving as
either driving under the influence (DUI) or driving while intoxicated (DWI). See Ekstrom, 136
Ariz. at 2, 663 P.2d at 993 (DWI); Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 276, 486 N.E.2d at 881 (DUI).
2. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138, § 34 (West Supp. 1985) (compare provisions effective
prior to June 1, 1985 with provisions effective June 1, 1985); N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 65 to
65-b (McKinney Supp. 1986) (compare provisions effective prior to Dec. 1, 1985 with provisions
effective Dec. 1, 1985). See also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-8-6 (Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-4203(b) (Supp. 1986); N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1986, at 59, col. 2 (Vermont raises minimum drinking age
from 18 to 21 effective July 1, 1986).
The federal government encourages raising the minimum drinking age to 21 by denying states
some highway funds if they don't raise their minimum drinking age by September 30, 1986. See 23
U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. III 1985).
3. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 23195 (West 1985) (impoundment of car of convicted drunk
driver); CAL. VEH. CODE § 23182 (West Supp. 1986) (enhanced sentence for convicted drunk driver
who causes bodily injury); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(l)(a)(1) (West Supp. 1986) (raised
minimum fine).
Illinois has passed a number of provisions, effective January 1, 1986, which increase the penalties for drunk driving. Supervision is no longer authorized for anyone convicted of DUI for a second
time within a five year period. Pub. Act 84-916, § 1, 1985 111. Laws 5831, 5831-33 (codified at Ill.
Uniform Code of Corrections § 5-6-1(d), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, %1005-6-1(d) (1985)). The penalty for drunk driving is increased from a misdemeanor to a felony if a person convicted of drunk
driving is involved in an accident causing "great bodily harm." Pub. Act 84-899, § 1, 1985 Il1. Laws
5735, 5736 (codified at Ill. Vehicle Code § 11-501(f), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 /2, 11-501(f) (1985)).
The new laws authorize police to administer tests after all accidents involving personal injury or
death. Pub. Act 84-272, § 7, 1985 Ill. Laws 2409, 2440-41 (codified at Ill. Vehicle Code § 11-501.3,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95/2,
11-501.3 (1985)). Furthermore, conviction for drunk driving now
makes a prima facie case for reckless homicide. Id. at § 2, 1985 Ill. Laws at 2413 (codified at Ill.
Criminal Code § 9-3(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 9-3(b) (1985)). Finally, the new laws provide for
a summary suspension of a driver's license for failing to take a sobriety test. Id. at § 7, 1985 Ill.
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states has been to set up roadblocks stopping motorists, and, without any
individualized suspicion, checking the drivers for signs of intoxication.
The Supreme Court has allowed fixed roadblocks for immigration
checks 4 and arguably approved of roadblocks for checking for drivers'
licenses and other vehicle violations. 5 However, the Court has not ruled
on the specific issue of whether temporary roadblocks to check for intoxicated drivers violates the constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 6 State courts are divided on the constitutionality
of such roadblocks 7 with most allowing roadblocks under specific cirLaws at 2433, 2437-40 (codified at Ill. Vehicle Code §§ 6-208.1, 11-501.I(c)-(h), ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
951A,
6-208.1, 11-501.1(c)-(h) (1985)).
See also State v.* McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1136 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
4. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
5. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983) (plurality opinion); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 663 (1979).
6. People v. Bartley, 109 Il. 2d 273, 283, 486 N.E.2d 880, 884 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1384 (1986); Nelson v. Lane County, 79 Or. App. 753, 762, 720 P.2d 1291, 1297, appeal granted,301
Or. 765, 726 P.2d 377 (1986).
Four months after the Illinois Supreme Court decided Bartley, the United States Supreme
Court passed up two opportunities to review the constitutionality of drunk driving roadblocks. See
Lowe v. Virginia, 106 S. Ct. 1464 (1986); Bartley v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 1384 (1986).
7. For courts upholding roadblocks see State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, 691 P.2d 1073
(1984); State v. Golden, 171 Ga. App. 27, 318 S.E.2d 693 (1984); People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273,
486 N.E.2d 880 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1384 (1986); State v. Garcia, 500 N.E.2d 158 (Ind.
1986); State v. Riley, 377 N.W.2d 242 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 673
P.2d 1174 (1983); Kinslow v. Commonwealth, 660 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983), cert denied,
465 U.S. 1105 (1984); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984); Commonwealth v. Trumble,
396 Mass. 81, 483 N.E.2d 1102 (1985); People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 473 N.E.2d 1, 483 N.Y.S.2d
649 (1984); State v. Alexander, 22 Ohio Misc. 2d 34, 489 N.E.2d 1093 (1985); State v. Martin, 145
Vt. 562, 496 A.2d 442 (1985); Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 337 S.E.2d 273 (1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1464 (1986); Fury v. City of Seattle, 46 Wash. App. 110, 730 P.2d 62 (1986); cf
Stark v. Perpich, 590 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Minn. 1984).
For courts striking down roadblocks as unconstitutional see State v. Jones, 483 So. 2d 433 (Fla.
1986) (but approving future roadblocks if procedures meet stated criteria); State v. Muzik, 379
N.W.2d 599 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Crom, 222 Neb. 273, 383 N.W.2d 461 (1986) (per
curiam) (no planning by supervisory personnel); State v. Koppel, 127 N.H. 286, 499 A.2d 977 (1985)
(on state constitutional grounds); State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); Nelson v.
Lane County, 79 Or. App. 753, 720 P.2d 1291 (on state constitutional grounds), appeal granted,301
Or. 765, 726 P.2d 377 (1986); Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 348 Pa. Super. 306, 502 A.2d 221 (1985),
(on state constitutional grounds), appeal granted, 513 A.2d 1381 (Pa. 1986); State v. Olgaard, 248
N.W.2d 392 (S.D. 1976); Webb v. State, 695 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
Some courts remain divided as to the constitutionality of roadblocks. Compare Ingersoll v.
Palmer, 175 Cal. App. 3d 1028, 221 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1985) (roadblock constitutional), vacated and
review granted, 41 Cal. 3d 714, 715 P.2d 680, 224 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1986) with In re Richard T., 185
Cal. App. 3d 855, 229 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1986) (roadblock unconstitutional) and State v. Coccomo, 177
N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131 (Law Div. 1980) (roadblock constitutional) with State v. Kirk, 202
N.J. Super. 28, 493 A.2d 1271 (App. Div. 1985) (roadblock unconstitutional on state constitutional
grounds but approving roadblocks under new police procedures).
Some courts that had previously found roadblocks unconstitutional have later found the
seizures constitutional when specific changes were made in the procedures. Compare State ex rel.
Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992 (1983) (roadblock unconstitutional due to discretion on the part of field officers) with State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, 691 P.2d 1073 (1984)
and Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.E.2d 349 (1983) (stops not made in
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cumstances. In People v. Bartley,8 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a
temporary roadblock that contained many of the features apparently required for constitutionality but lacked others.
This comment will first analyze the development by the Supreme
Court of reasoning that allows, under certain circumstances, the stopping
of automobiles without individualized suspicion. The focus will then
shift to the history of Bartley and how the Illinois Supreme Court arrived
at the conclusion that the Bartley roadblock did not violate the constitution. The analysis will suggest possible shortcomings in the Bartley
court's reasoning and discuss possible requirements to make future roadblocks pass constitutional muster.
LEGAL HISTORY

The fourth amendment protects individuals against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 9 The reason for this prohibition is to protect individuals' privacy and security from arbitrary intrusions of governmental
officials. 10 The Supreme Court has determined the reasonableness, and
thus the constitutionality of seizures, by balancing the public purpose
served by the seizure; whether the specific actions accomplish that public
safe manner and field officers exercised discretion) with Commonwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81,
483 N.E.2d 1102 (1985).
Oregon courts had found roadblocks constitutional under the fourth amendment but later held
that these checkpoints violated the Oregon Constitution. Compare State v. Shankle, 58 Or. App.
134, 647 P.2d 959 (1982) with Nelson v. Lane County, 79 Or. App. 753, 720 P.2d 1291, appeal
granted, 301 Or. 765, 726 P.2d 377 (1986).
Other courts have allowed roadblocks for license and safety checks. See United States v. DiazAlbertini, 772 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Prichard, 645 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1982); State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143 (Me. 1985); State v. Goines, 16
Ohio App. 3d 168, 474 N.E.2d 1219 (1984). But see State v. Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d 314 (Iowa
1980); State v. Goehring, 374 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 1985); State v. Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d 434, 706
P.2d 225 (1985).
Texas considers driver's license roadblocks, which are authorized by statute, constitutional but
drunk driving roadblocks unconstitutional. Carter v. State, 700 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
Compare Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981), rev'don other grounds, 460 U.S.
730 (1983) with Webb v. State, 695 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
8. 109 Il.2d 273, 486 N.E.2d 880 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1384 (1986).
9. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment makes the fourth amendment enforceable
against the states. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961).
10. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
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purpose; and the intrusiveness on the individual."l The results of balancing these factors generally require "specific, objective facts" to justify the
seizure of a person. 12 However, when the balancing test justifies a seizure
without some objective facts, the fourth amendment requires a "plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations" to limit the discretion of the police. t 3 These factors are important as applied to drunk driving
roadblocks because the Supreme Court has stated that stopping a car at a
4
roadblock is a seizure for the purposes of the fourth amendment.'
Over the last ten to fifteen years, the Supreme Court has outlined
the fourth amendment limitations on automobile stops. In AlmeidaSanchez v. United States,' 5 the Court considered the case of a defendant
whose car was stopped and searched by a roving patrol of the United
States Border Patrol without a warrant, probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion. 16 Although the government relied on a statute that authorized automobile searches within a "reasonable distance" of the
border, the Court stated that such searches, without probable cause, vio7
lated the fourth amendment.'
11. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979). See also United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,
462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983).
12. Brown, 443 U.S. at 51. This objective standard allows seizures for probable cause or when
an officer has "reasonable suspicion" for the seizure. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
13. Brown, 443 U.S. at 51.
14. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976).
15. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
16. Id. at 267-68. The defendant's car was stopped twenty-five miles north of the Mexican
border. Id.
The Almeida-Sanchez Court acknowledged that searches and seizures of automobiles were permitted without a warrant. Id. at 269. See also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Cardwell
v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (plurality opinion); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). However, the Court stated that any search of an automobile
still required probable cause on the part of the authorities. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 269-70.
See also Ross, 456 U.S. at 809 & n.ll; Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51.
Recently, however, the Court has carved out limited exceptions to the probable cause requirement for car searches. See New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986) (reaching into car to expose
Vehicle Identification Number after car stopped for some probable cause is reasonable); Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (search of passenger compartment for weapons may be based on reasonable suspicion); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (search of passenger compartment allowed
as search incident to arrest).
The Supreme Court allowed an exception to the probable cause requirement by allowing a
limited search for weapons if a policeman had a reasonable suspicion that a person was "armed and
dangerous." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968). The reasonable suspicion standard requires police
to "be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant" the search or seizure. Id. at 21. The Court eventually extended this lower reasonable suspicion standard to seizures of automobiles by the Border Patrol. See
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975); discussed infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. Furthermore, reasonable suspicion can support a limited car search for weapons. See
Long, 463 U.S. at 1049-51.
17. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273-75.
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Two years later, in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,'8 the Court considered whether a roving patrol could stop an automobile and briefly
question the occupants without reasonable suspicion to determine if they
were illegal aliens. The Court balanced the important governmental interest in interdicting illegal aliens against interference with the individuals' liberty. Because the intrusion was limited, the Court decided that
probable cause was not necessary for police to stop cars. However, the
Court still required that the Border Patrol officers have reasonable suspicion that a car contained illegal aliens before stopping an automobile.' 9
On the same day that the Court held roving patrol stops without
reasonable suspicion unconstitutional, the Court decided, in United
States v. Ortiz,20 whether searches without probable cause were permissible at fixed immigration checkpoints which were not located at the border. The government sought to distinguish Ortiz from Almeida-Sanchez
by relying on the limitations on the Border Patrol's discretion on whom
to stop. Additionally, the government pointed out that motorists were
less likely to be frightened at a fixed roadblock than if stopped by a roving patrol and this would reduce the intrusion on the individuals. 2 ' The
Court noted that there was a significant distinction between stopping a
car at a fixed checkpoint and a similar stop by a roving patrol but held
that these differences were not of such a magnitude to allow searching
22
vehicles without probable cause.
This line of cases, which prohibited searches by either roving patrols
or at fixed checkpoints without probable cause and further prohibited
stops by roving patrols without reasonable suspicion, led to UnitedStates
v. Martinez-Fuerte.23 Faced with the question of the constitutionality of
stopping vehicles at fixed checkpoints without reasonable suspicion, the
Court balanced the public interest in stopping the flow of illegal aliens
and smugglers against the intrusion on the individual occupants of the
18. 422 U.S. 873 (1975). The sole basis for stopping the automobiles was that the occupants
appeared to be Mexican. Id. at 876-77. No search was involved in this case. The fact that the
vehicle's occupants appeared to be Mexican was not sufficient to justify the roving patrol stop. Id. at
885-87.
19. Id. at 881.84. The Court emphasized that even under the lower reasonable suspicion standard, the Border Patrol could only briefly question the occupants of the automobile. The Court still
required probable cause for a search or a more extensive seizure. Id. at 881-82. But see Long, 463
U.S. at 1049-51.
20. 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
21. Id. at 894-95.
22. Id. at 896-98. The Court noted, however, that they were not deciding the question of
whether fixed checkpoint stops without probable cause were constitutional. Id. at 897 n.3. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the holding in Ortiz was limited to searches
and not to stops at fixed immigration checkpoints. Id. at 898-99 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
23. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
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vehicles. 24
The Court divided the intrusion on the individual into two categories--objective and subjective. 25 The objective intrusiveness was found
to be minimal because of the briefness of the stop, the limited amount of
questioning, and the solely visual inspection. The Court specifically
26
noted that neither the individuals nor the car was searched.
The subjective intrusion was similarly limited by the checks imposed
by a fixed checkpoint. First, because the checkpoints were fixed, motorists knew or should have known of their locations. This would eliminate
any surprise at being stopped. Second, occupants of all cars were able to
see that the operation of the checkpoint was not at the discretion of the
officers in the field. The location was chosen by supervisory personnel
who allocated the officers to accomplish the assigned task. Furthermore,
since only cars entering the checkpoint could be stopped, motorists need
not fear harassment or arbitrariness in the selection of which vehicles to
stop. 27 The Court, therefore, held that less than reasonable suspicion
was required to stop and question motorists at "reasonably located
checkpoints.

' '28

In Delaware v. Prouse,29 the Court again considered a stop by a roving patrol but this time for an automobile license and safety check. The
Court noted that random stops by Border Patrol agents without reasonable suspicion were unconstitutional and that both the objective and subjective intrusiveness of random license stops were no less than those
24. Id. at 557-61. In addition to interdicting illegal aliens and smugglers, the Court stated that
making their avoidance of detection more difficult was also in the public interest. Id. at 557.
25. Id. at 558. Objective intrusion is of a physical nature and focuses on the "nature, duration
and scope" of the seizure. Subjective intrusion, which focuses on the psychological effects on the
individual, is concerned with how a person perceives or reacts to the seizure. Id. at 558. See also
Jacobs & Strossen, Mass Investigations Without Individualized Suspicion: A Constitutionaland Policy Critique of Drunk Driving Roadblocks, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 595, 629 (1985).
26. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 558.
27. Id. at 558-59. The Court rejected the requirement of a warrant for fixed checkpoints because of the ease of court review of the location and operation of the checkpoint. Id at 565-66.
28. Id. at 562. Although the question of stopping automobiles for other than immigration purposes was not before the Martinez-Fuerte Court, the majority noted that states had long stopped
motorists to check for drivers licenses and compliance with safety requirements. Id.at 560 n. 14. See
also Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 897 n.3; Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 883 n.8.
The Court has allowed searches and seizures without probable cause or reasonable suspicion in
several other contexts. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (inspection of underground
mines); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (inspection of business premises); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (code-enforcement inspection of personal residence); see also
New York v. Class, 106 S.Ct. 960 (1986) (limited search to expose Vehicle Identification Number);
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983) (customs officers inspecting documents
aboard a ship which could easily leave United States waters); cf INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210
(1984) (immigration "survey" not a seizure).
29. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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caused by roving border patrols. 30 Although the Court agreed that the
states had an important interest in promoting highway safety by insuring
that only licensed drivers and safe vehicles were on the roads, these inter3t
ests were outweighed by the individuals' fourth amendment interests.
The Court concluded that even though the intrusions on the motorist
were limited, the stops were constitutionally proscribed because there
were no standards controlling the action of police or limiting their
32
discretion.
The importance of Prouse as applied to drunk driving roadblocks,
however, is the dicta that followed the holding. 33 The Court stated that
alternatives that limited the discretion of police officers in choosing motorists such as stopping all cars at a roadblock, might be allowed. 34 Furthermore, two concurring justices suggested that stopping cars according
to a preset formula (every tenth car was given as an example) should also
35
be permissible.
Even with this dicta, Prouse left the question of stopping motorists
for safety checks unsettled. Random stops without reasonable suspicion
were constitutionally proscribed while stops at fixed checkpoints were
30. Id. at 657. The Court noted that the inconvenience to motorists, as well as the anxiety
caused by being pulled over in a seemingly random fashion, were similar whether inflicted by police
making a random license check or by a roving immigration patrol. Id.
31. Id. at 658-59. The Court noted that the state's interest in arresting drunk drivers or those
driving under the influence of drugs was a part of the interest in promoting highway safety. Id. at
659 n.18.
A major factor in the Court's decision not to allow random traffic stops were the alternatives
available to the state such as direct observation by police officers. Id. at 659-60. But see People v.
Bartley, 125 Ill. App. 3d 575, 578, 466 N.E.2d 346, 348 (1984), rev'd, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 486 N.E.2d 880
(1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1384 (1986); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 545, 673 P.2d 1174, 1187
(1983) (Prager, J., dissenting).
The Court further assumed, in the absence of statistics, that unlicensed drivers were less safe
than licensed drivers, and therefore, the probability that a traffic violator will be unlicensed was
greater than the probability of a randomly selected motorist being unlicensed. Prouse, 440 U.S. at
659-60. The notion of showing the effectiveness of the random stops in Prouse carries over to the
question of the effectiveness of drunk driving roadblocks. See infra text accompanying notes 46-48.
32. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663.
33. See Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 25, at 616-17 & n.95. The authors state that in Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) and United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983), the
Court has considered the dictum as holding. See also Webb v. State, 695 S.W.2d 676, 684 n.2 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1985) (Sparling, J., dissenting).
34. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. See Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 588-89.
35. Prouse,440 U.S. at 664 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist noted
that the requirement to stop all motorists rather than stopping random motorists "elevates the adage
'misery loves company' to a novel role in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." Id. at 664 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's main objection was with the holding of Prouse and not the
dicta. He would have allowed random stops. Id. at 667. See also State v. Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d
434, 438, 706 P.2d 225, 227 (1985) ("The logic of this belief [that stopping all automobiles is less
intrusive than stopping particular cars] escapes us.").
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acceptable even in the absence of individualized suspicion. 36 However,
most motorist checkpoints fall somewhere in between and are similar to
37
the temporary checkpoints referred to in Martinez-Fuerte.
In Texas v. Brown, 38 the Court gave a brief indication of the constitutionality of such temporary checkpoints. The case involved a stop at a
"routine driver's license checkpoint" in Fort Worth. 39 Seven justices
either explicitly or implicitly agreed with the Texas appellate court that
there was no reason to question the constitutionality of the initial stop at
the roadblock. 4° With this limited guidance from the Supreme Court,
the states proceeded to determine the constitutionality of drunk driving
roadblocks.
While some state courts held drunk driving roadblocks unconstitutional per se, 41 most courts applied the balancing tests articulated by the
Supreme Court in Martinez-Fuerte,Prouse, and Brown. A major concern
in the state cases was the discretion of the officers in the field in setting up
36. Compare Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) with United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543 (1976).
37. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 552. See State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562, 563 (Okla. Crim. App.
1984).
38. 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (plurality opinion). This case is not related to Brown v. Texas, 443
U.S. 47 (1979), discussed supra notes 11-13.
39. Brown, 460 U.S. at 733 (opinion of Rehnquist, J.). The checkpoint was set up first at one
location in the city and an hour later at a second location where the defendant was later stopped.
The officers funneled all vehicles toward the checkpoint and stopped each automobile. The roadblocks were set up solely to check for driver's license, registration, and vehicle inspection violators.
Petitioner's Brief at 2-3, Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983). While the defendant did not contest
the validity of the stop during his state appeal, he questioned whether all cars were stopped at the
roadblock where he was arrested. Respondent's Brief at 8 n.2, Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
Following the stop, the policemen shined a flashlight in the car and saw a balloon which was later
found to contain heroin. Brown, 460 U.S. at 733, 735 (opinion of Rehnquist, J.).
40. The discussion of both courts was minimal. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals described the roadblock as "a routine and nonrandom license check." Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196,
199 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981), rev'd on othergrounds, 460 U.S. 730 (1983). The court went on to state:
"We do not here question ... the validity of the officer's initial stop of appellant's vehicle as a part of
a license check." 617 S.W.2d at 200. Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plurality of the Court, added,
"and we agree." Brown, 460 U.S. at 739 (opinion of Rehnquist, J.). The major question for both
courts, however, was whether the seizure of the balloon later found to contain heroin was constitutional under the "plain view" doctrine. Id. at 732-33.
For a seizure to be constitutional under the "plain-view" doctrine, the "initial intrusion" must
be lawful. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-68 (1971) (opinion of Stewart, J.). In
Brown, three concurring justices found the seizure of the balloon constitutional. Brown, 460 U.S. at
750 (Stevens, J., concurring). Consequently, they implicitly agreed that the initial stop also had to
be constitutional.
The two remaining concurring justices did not reach the issue of whether the stop was constitutional. They stated that the defendant did not question the propriety of the initial stop. Brown, 460
U.S. at 746 (Powell, J., concurring).
41. See State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562, 565 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); State v. Olgaard, 248
N.W.2d 392 (S.D. 1976) (decided prior to Prouse). Two post-Bartley decisions found roadblocks per
se violations of state constitutions. See Nelson v. Lane County, 79 Or. App. 753, 720 P.2d 1291,
1296, appealgranted, 301 Or. 765, 726 P.2d 377 (1986); Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 348 Pa. Super.
306, 502 A.2d 221, 226 (1985), appeal granted, 513 A.2d 1381 (Pa. 1986).
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the roadblock and determining procedures for operation of the roadblock. 42 Stopping every car (or cars according to a pre-set formula) was
not enough. The courts required that the roadblocks be similar to the
immigration checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte. They required that both the
43
roadblock and the procedures be planned by administrative personnel.
Other concerns expressed by the courts that distinguished drunk driving
roadblocks from fixed immigration checkpoints were the lack of notice to
motorists, 44 and possibly frightening motorists by not insuring their
45
safety during the stop.
However, the most controversial question was the effectiveness of
the roadblocks in apprehending drunk drivers. 46 Some courts insisted
that the states show that checkpoints were more effective than the traditional solution of police observing motorists and thus detecting drunk
drivers. 47 Some courts considering the effectiveness of the blockades,
however, have considered the deterrent of the roadblocks in the balanc48
ing equation rather than the apprehension rate.
From these concerns, the courts developed tests to determine the
constitutionality of drunk driving roadblocks. 49 What became apparent
from these cases was that the reasonableness of any given seizure depended on the specific facts of each case. With this as guidance, the
Illinois courts considered the constitutionality of such roadblocks.
A month before the Prouse decision, the Illinois Appellate Court, in
People v. Estrada,50 considered the constitutionality of a "systematic
check" of automobile safety equipment. The Estrada safety check was
42. Compare State ex reL Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 5, 9, 663 P.2d 992, 996, 1000
(1983) with State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 542, 673 P.2d 1174, 1185 (1983).
43. Deskins, 234 Kan. at 542, 673 P.2d at 1185; State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 583,
427 A.2d 131, 135 (Law Div. 1980); cf Ekstrom, 136 Ariz. at 5, 663 P.2d at 996; Commonwealth v.
McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 143, 449 N.E.2d 349, 353 (1983).
The Deskins court specifically stated that "unbridled discretion of the officer in the field' would
invalidate the roadblock regardless of other factors. Deskins, 234 Kan. at 541, 673 P.2d at 1185.
44. Ekstrom, 136 Ariz. at 5, 663 P.2d at 996; McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. at 143-44, 449 N.E.2d
at 353; cf Deskins, 234 Kan. at 541, 673 P.2d at 1185.
45. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. at 143, 449 N.E.2d at 353.
46. This requirement is also imposed by a factor in the balancing test stated in Brown v. Texas
which considers "the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest." See supra note 11
and accompanying text.
47. Ekstrom, 136 Ariz. at 5, 663 P.2d at 996; Deskins, 234 Kan. at 544-45, 673 P.2d at 1187
(Prager, J., dissenting).
This requirement apparently followed from the Supreme Court's finding in Prouse that there
were other, more effective methods of accomplishing the state's purpose. See supra text accompanying note 31. See also W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.8, at 207-08 (Supp. 1986).
48. Ekstrom, 136 Ariz. at 10, 663 P.2d at 1001 (Feldman, J., concurring); Deskins, 234 Kan. at
537, 673 P.2d at 1182. See W. LAFAVE, supra note 47, at § 10.8, at 209.
49. See, e.g., Deskins, 234 Kan. at 541, 673 P.2d at 1185.
50. 68 I11.
App. 3d 272, 386 N.E.2d 128, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 968 (1979).
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set up by two Illinois State policemen who after finishing the check of a
car, stopped the next automobile approaching the checkpoint. 51 The
court noted the important state interest in highway safety and stated that
52
many safety violations could only be detected by stopping vehicles.
The court concluded that the safety check was constitutional because the
limited police discretion of a "systematic check" distinguished such stops
'5 3
from unconstitutional "spot checks."

In People v. Long,54 another district of the appellate court extended
this reasoning to the arrest for drunk driving of a defendant who stopped
100 yards prior to a driver's license checkpoint. The court similarly upheld the constitutionality of this checkpoint because the important state
interest in highway safety and the limited police discretion outbalanced
any fourth amendment concerns. 55 Fifteen days later, the same appellate
56
court decided Bartley.
PEOPLE V. BARTLEY
FACTS OF THE CASE

In early December, 1982, two supervisory officers of the Illinois
State Police decided to set up a roadblock in McDonough County for the
purported purpose of checking drivers' licenses. The location of the
roadblock was established by these supervisors. 57 The plan was for the
field officers manning the checkpoint to stop every westbound automobile, however, this procedure could be and was dispensed with when traf51. Id. at 274, 386 N.E.2d at 129-30. The defendant was arrested for possession of marijuana

and the trial court granted his motion to suppress the evidence concluding that stopping the defendant's car violated the fourth amendment. Id. at 273-74, 386 N.E.2d at 129.
52. Id. at 278-79, 386 N.E.2d at 132-33. The court specifically stated that inoperable horns and
unsafe tires can only be checked by stopping a car. Furthermore, police generally can not observe
turn signals and malfunctioning lights during the day. Id. at 278, 386 N.E.2d at 132.
53. Id. at 278-79, 386 N.E.2d at 132-33. Estrada was followed by People v. Lust, 119 Ill.
App.
3d 509, 456 N.E.2d 980 (1983) where another district of the Illinois Appellate Court upheld a safety
check of trucks, also conducted by the Illinois State Police. The field officers had the discretion of
where to locate the checkpoints and to pass trucks if traffic backed up. Id. at 511,456 N.E.2d at 981.
In reversing the trial court's suppression order, the appellate court focused on the important state
interest in highway safety as well as the limited discretion given the field officers on which trucks to
stop. Id. at 511-12, 456 N.E.2d at 982-83. The court specifically stated that the limited discretion
given to the officers on where to locate the checkpoint, how long to operate the checkpoint, and
when traffic became heavy enough to justify passing trucks did not change the balancing equation to
make the checkpoint unconstitutional. Id. at 513, 456 N.E.2d at 983.
54. 124 Il. App. 3d 1030, 465 N.E.2d 123 (1984).
55. Id. at 1034-35, 465 N.E.2d at 126-27.
56. Two of the three judges were common to both panels. Compare People v. Bartley, 125 I1.
App. 3d 575, 576, 579, 466 N.E.2d 347, 347, 349 (1984), rev'd, 109 Ill.
2d 273, 486 N.E.2d 880
(1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1384 (1986) with Long, 124 Ill.
App. 3d at 1031, 1035, 465 N.E.2d at
124, 127.
57. People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 277, 486 N.E.2d 880, 881 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1384 (1986).
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fic backed up. The roadblock was set up on a five lane highway in a
lighted area and police cruisers were stationed with their lights flashing
to "funnel" the cars into the roadblock. 5 8 The officers in the field were
told to work in teams of two with one officer asking the driver for his
driver's license and shining a flashlight into the automobile while the
other officer checked the car's exterior, interior, and license plate. Furthermore, the field officers were instructed to operate the checkpoint in
accordance with a manual prepared by the State Police. 59
Approximately one hour before commencement of the operation,
one of the supervising officers briefed the field officers. The briefing was
not attended by every field policeman including the officer who arrested
the defendant. 60 The field officers were told to enforce other violations of
traffic laws including those applying to drunk driving but there was no
testimony concerning supervisory instructions on identifying suspected
61
drunk drivers.
The roadblock was in operation for approximately two hours and
near the end of that time period, the defendant was stopped and given
"field sobriety tests" which he failed. He then refused to take a
breathalyzer test and was arrested. 62 The defendant moved to suppress

the evidence and his arrest as violative of his fourth amendment rights.
63
The trial court agreed.
REASONING

OF THE APPELLATE COURT

The appellate court applied the balancing test enunciated in Brown
v. Texas 6 to determine the constitutionality of the roadblock. Although
58. Id. at 277-78, 486 N.E.2d at 882. The roadblock was a coordinated operation involving the
State Police, county sheriff, city police and Secretary of State's police.
59. Id. at 278, 486 N.E.2d at 882. For a photograph showing the Illinois State Police checking
an automobile at a drunk driving roadblock in April, 1986 see Chi. Tribune, April 14, 1986, § 2, at 1,
cols. 2-5.
60. Bartley, 109 Il1. 2d at 277-79, 486 N.E.2d at 882. The other officer in the team, however,
had attended the briefing. Id. at 277, 486 N.E.2d at 882.
Although several policemen, including the arresting officer, understood that the purpose of the
roadblock was to conduct driver's license checks, one of the supervising policemen stated that another reason for the checkpoint was to stop drunk drivers. Id. at 278-79, 486 N.E.2d at 882. This
State Police supervisor described the roadblock on a television videotape as "part of a crackdown on
holiday drunk drivers." Id. at 279, 486 N.E.2d at 882. In spite of this television interview, however,
no advanced publicity of the roadblock was given to the public. Id. at 292, 486 N.E.2d at 888.
61. Id. at 278-79, 486 N.E.2d at 882.
62. Id. at 279, 486 N.E.2d at 883. The trial judge determined that the police had neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause to stop the defendant. Id. at 280, 486 N.E.2d at 883.
63. People v. Bartley, 125 I11.App. 3d 575, 576, 466 N.E.2d 346, 347 (1984), rev'd, 109 Ill. 2d
273, 486 N.E.2d 880 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1384 (1986). The trial court also determined
that the true purpose of the roadblock was to apprehend drunk drivers and that the license checkpoint justification "was a subterfuge." Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 279-80, 486 N.E.2d at 883.
64. 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979). See supra text accompanying note 11.
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the court found a legitimate public interest in reducing alcohol related
deaths and injuries, the court also found that the roadblock was not the
only effective method of detecting or deterring drunk drivers. 65 The
court, therefore, interpreted the fourth amendment to require the state to
show that roadblocks were more effective than less intrusive conventional
methods. The appellate court also criticized the subjective intrusion of
the roadblock including the lack of criteria for selecting the time and
location of the roadblock. 6 6 The State then appealed to the Illinois
67
Supreme Court.

ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT'S DECISION

Justice Simon, writing for a unanimous court, balanced the public
65. Bartley, 125 Ill. App. 3d at 578. 466 N.E.2d at 348. The court stated that observation "by a
trained officer" was the primary method of locating drunk drivers. Id. Furthermore, the court
distinguished Martinez-Fuerteand Prouse by stating that illegal aliens and those driving with invalid
licenses or unsafe vehicles could not be easily detected by observation. Id. But see Prouse, 440 U.S.
at 659-60. The court also suggested that harsher punishment for drunk driving was another less
intrusive method of removing intoxicated drivers from the road. Bartley, 125 Ill. App. 3d at 578,
466 N.E.2d at 348.
Curiously, the Bartley court made no attempt to distinguish Long, thus creating uncertainties.
See State v. Garcia, 481 N.E.2d 148, 153 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), aff'd, 500 N.E.2d 158 (Ind. 1986).
The only difference between the cases appears to be that the Long checkpoint was set up to check for
drivers' licenses and not as a subterfuge for drunk driving checks. Long, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 1034,
465 N.E.2d at 126. This distinction appears to be critical to the Bartley court. See Bartley, 125 Ill.
App. 3d at 578, 466 N.E.2d at 348.
An appellate panel from another district disagreed with the conclusions drawn by the Bartley
court. People v. Conway, 135 Ill. App. 3d 887, 892-93, 482 N.E.2d 437, 440 (1985). The Conway
court rejected the argument that increased penalties for drunk driving would adequately promote the
state's objective of stopping drunk drivers. By analogy, the court noted that while the same argument could be made against roadblocks for safety or driver's license infractions, courts had not
seriously considered this alternative in the balancing equation. Id. at 892, 482 N.E.2d at 440. Furthermore, the Conway court rejected the less intrusive alternative of apprehending drunk drivers
solely on direct police observation by stating that not all drunk driving takes place within sight of the
police. Id. at 892-93, 482 N.E.2d at 440.
The roadblock considered by the Conway Court was similar in nature to the Bartley roadblock.
The Conway roadblock was set up by the Secretary of State's police on a four lane highway. One
direction of traffic was met with warning signs and traffic cones and then funneled into a single lane.
Police cruisers on the scene operated with their lights flashing. If the traffic at the roadblock backed
up and created a possible safety problem, the field supervisor could pass vehicles at his discretion.
No cars were passed the night of the Conway roadblock. Id. at 888-89, 482 N.E.2d at 437-38.
Each car was stopped and the driver was asked to show her driver's license. The officers then
checked the license as well as the license plate registration. If the officers in the field suspected a
driver of drunk driving, the officer requested the motorist to perform "field sobriety tests." Id.
The Conway court did not discuss if the location and procedures were selected by supervisory
personnel. However, a police captain testified concerning typical procedures used for setting up and
operating such roadblocks. Id. at 888, 482 N.E.2d at 437-38.
66. Factors that the court referred to were the temporary and shifting nature of the roadblock,
the fact that the stops were made at night with officers shining flashlights into the motorists' eyes and
looking into the car, and that the occupants were not told the reason for the stop until they were
asked for their driver's licenses. Bartley, 125 Ill. App. 3d at 579, 466 N.E.2d at 348.
67. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 276-77, 486 N.E.2d at 881.
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interest in reducing drunk driving against motorists' fourth amendment
interests. 68 Noting the seriousness of the drunk driving problem, the
court found a "compelling" state interest which justified "some intrusion
. . . in order to reduce alcohol related accidents and deter [drunk]
69

driving."
The court found that the roadblock accomplished the public purpose, by emphasizing the deterrent effect of roadblocks and deferring to
the state on the choice of means. Although no statistics on the effectiveness of roadblocks were stated, the court evaluated the deterrent effect of
'70
the roadblocks on the "basis of common sense."
The third part of the balancing process involves weighing the intrusiveness of the seizure. The court found that the time period of the
seizure was minimal, 15 to 20 seconds. The nature of the questioning,
71
simply asking motorists for their licenses, was not a great intrusion.
Similarly, the court found that shining flashlights into the car was a reasonable action and did not result in an unacceptable level of objective
68. Id. at 285, 486 N.E.2d at 885. The court first stated that the Supreme Court, in Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983), had not objected to the roadblock or the actions of officers in checking a
car's interior. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. After reviewing other prior Supreme
Court cases concerning fixed checkpoints and roving patrols as well as prior state court cases, the
court determined standards for measuring both objective and subjective intrusions caused by the
roadblock stop. Bartley, 109 Il1. 2d at 280-83, 486 N.E.2d at 883-84. In its analysis, the court
emphasized the factors which the Supreme Court found acceptable in Martinez-Fuerte. See supra
notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
69. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 285, 486 N.E.2d at 885. The court rejected requiring statistics to
show the extent of the drunk driving problem in Illinois or the City of Macomb where the roadblock
was setup. The rejection related to whether the state had an important interest in detecting and
deterring drunk driving. Id. at 286, 486 N.E.2d at 886. The lack of statistics does not appear in the
court's analysis of whether the roadblock was set up in a location designed to accomplish the state's
objective. Some states consider such statistics important to determine if the location of the roadblock will accomplish the state's goal. See infra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
The court also rejected the argument that the less intrusive method of detecting drunk drivers
by observation was a more effective method of accomplishing this important state purpose. Bartley,
109 Ill. 2d at 286, 486 N.E.2d at 886. The court gave three reasons for this finding. First, using
reasoning similar to the Conway court, the supreme court stated that not all drunk driving occurs
within sight of the police and thus a drunk driver can be involved in an accident before she would be
detected by normal police observations. Id. Furthermore, the court added that normal observations
may not detect a driver who is impaired to the point of not being able to respond to emergency
conditions. Id. at 287, 486 N.E.2d at 886. See also infra note 90. Finally, the court noted that
because the problem of drunk driving was so severe, complimentary actions of roadblocks and detecting violators by observation were warranted. Bartley, 109 IIl. 2d at 287, 486 N.E.2d at 886.
70. Bartley, 109 IIl. 2d at 287, 486 N.E.2d at 886. See also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 175 Cal. App.
3d 1028, 1040-41, 221 Cal. Rptr. 659, 666 (1985), vacated and review granted, 41 Cal. 3d 714, 715
P.2d 680, 224 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1986); People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 528-29, 473 N.E.2d 1, 6, 483
N.Y.S.2d 649, 654 (1984).
71. Bartley, 109 Il. 2d at 287-88, 486 N.E.2d at 886. The court concluded that the objective
intrusion did not exceed that experienced at fixed immigration checkpoints. Id. at 288, 486 N.E.2d
at 886. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976). See also Little v. State, 300
Md. 485, 508, 479 A.2d 903, 914 (1984).
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intrusiveness. 7

2

Finally, the court turned toward the subjective intrusion of the particular roadblock. The court emphasized that the elimination of discretion on the part of the police officers in the field, as well as operating the
roadblock under safe conditions, minimized motorists' apprehension of
73
being endangered or selectively stopped.
The court first stated that the fear of arbitrary police action was
reduced because both the decision to set up the roadblock and the site
74
selection were made by supervisory officers of the Illinois State Police.
Secondly, cars were stopped in a "preestablished, systematic fashion"
which further reduced the subjective concerns and distinguished the
Bartley roadblock from a "roving patrol. ' 75 The third factor which limited police discretion was the existence of planned procedures for roadblock operations. The court stated that the State Police supervisory
personnel pre-roadblock briefing on how the field officers were to con76
duct the roadblock satisfied this criterion.
72. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 288, 486 N.E.2d at 886-87. The court determined that looking into
cars with flashlights was a reasonable method to insure the safety of the police in the event the
vehicle's occupants had weapons. Furthermore, there was a reasonable relationship between the
effort to halt drunk driving and setting up the roadblocks at night-more drunk drivers are on the
road at night. Id. See also Scott, 63 N.Y.2d at 523, 473 N.E.2d at 2, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 650.
The court had earlier stated that the driver's license check in Texas v. Brown involved shining a
flashlight into the car. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 283, 486 N.E.2d at 884. Other courts have considered
the shining of flashlights into the car as part of the subjective intrusion analysis. See State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, 49, 691 P.2d 1073, 1077 (1984); Little, 300 Md. at 506, 479 A.2d at 914.
One distinguishing feature of the Little roadblock that made the shining of the flashlight less
subjectively intrusive than in Bartley was that in Little the flashlight was shined only at the driver
and not at the rest of the interior of the car. Little, 300 Md. at 492, 479 A.2d at 906.
73. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 288, 486 N.E.2d at 887.
74. Id. at 289, 486 N.E.2d at 887. See State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. at 47, 691 P.2d at
1075; Little, 300 Md. at 490, 479 A.2d at 905; Commonwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81, 84, 483
N.E.2d 1102, 1104 (1985); Scott, 63 N.Y.2d at 523, 473 N.E.2d at 2-3, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 650-51; State
v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562, 573, 496 A.2d 442, 449 (1985).
75. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 289, 486 N.E.2d at 887. See also Palmer, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 132,
221 Cal. Rptr. at 660 (every fifth northbound car); State v. Garcia, 500 N.E.2d 158, 160 (Ind. 1986)
(groups of five cars); State v. Riley, 377 N.W.2d 242, 243 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (all eastbound cars
stopped); Deskins, 234 Kan. at 542, 673 P.2d at 1185 (all cars stopped); Little, 300 Md. at 506, 479
A.2d at 913 (all cars stopped); Trumble, 396 Mass. at 85, 483 N.E.2d at 1104 (all cars stopped but no
trucks or tractor-trailers); Scott, 63 N.Y.2d at 523, 473 N.E.2d at 2, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 650 (all cars
stopped); Martin, 145 Vt. at 572, 496 A.2d at 449 (all traffic stopped); cf State v. Marchand, 104
Wash. 2d 434, 435, 706 P.2d 225, 225 (1985) (after check completed next car stopped).
76. Bartley, 109 11. 2d at 290, 486 N.E.2d at 887. However, the court noted that no formal,
detailed instructions were given to the officers manning the roadblock on procedures for detecting
drunk drivers. Id. The court noted that other jurisdictions did provide such detailed instructions.
See infra note 118.
The court did not consider this lack of guidelines significant because the officers in the field were
experienced in singling out drunk drivers based on their observations. Furthermore, the court stated
that the lack of guidelines would not increase the motorists' fears because of the "systematic operation" of the roadblock. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 290, 486 N.E.2d at 888.
The arresting officer had been a policeman for over one year and "had seen intoxicated persons
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The court next analyzed whether the roadblock was conducted in a
safe manner and in such a way as to show motorists that it was an official
police operation. The Bartley roadblock met these requirements. 77 Finally, the court turned to the question of whether advanced notice of
roadblocks was necessary to further reduce the fears of motorists. While
noting that advanced publicity increased the deterrent effect of roadblocks, the court concluded that the roadblock contained sufficient safeguards to prevent this lack of advanced publicity from causing the
78
roadblock to be unconstitutional.
ANALYSIS

The Illinois Supreme Court stated that stopping motorists at roadblocks without probable cause was not per se unconstitutional 79 and
noted that the United States Supreme Court had allowed both searches
and seizures in the past without probable cause or individualized suspicion.80 Furthermore, the dicta in Prouse indicating that stopping all cars
to check for driver's licenses might be constitutional, and the facts of
Texas v. Brown, 81 where the Court did not challenge "a routine and nonrandom license check," give added weight to the argument that the
Supreme Court is unlikely to hold drunk driving roadblocks unconstitutional per se. 8 2 Therefore, as almost every court facing the same question
has done,83 the Illinois Supreme Court applied a balancing test to weigh
on numerous occasions." Id. at 279, 486 N.E.2d at 882. Because of the officer's experience, the
court was similarly not disturbed that the arresting officer had not attended the pre-roadblock briefing. The court noted, however, that his teammate at the roadblock attended the briefing and that the
other officer then suggested that the sobriety tests be administered to the defendant. Id. at 290, 486
N.E.2d at 888.
77. Id. at 291, 486 N.E.2d at 888. Presumably one reason for the requirement of showing an
official police operation is to eliminate fears that the stop is being made by persons impersonating
police officers who might harm the car's occupants. Cf Palmer, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 1044, 221 Cal.
Rptr. at 669 ("reassure motorists that the stop is duly authorized").
The court also found that the subjective fears of the automobile occupants were not increased
by the "subterfuge" of calling the roadblock a license check, rather than identifying it as its true
purpose, a drunk driving roadblock. The court emphasized that any added inconvenience caused by
the police checking for signs of intoxication was minimal. Bartley, 109 Il.2d at 292, 486 N.E.2d at
888-89.
78. 109 Ill.
2d at 291-92, 486 N.E.2d at 888-89. Other roadblocks have been preceded by
widescale publicity. See infra note 105.
79. Bartley, 109 Ill.
2d at 280, 486 N.E.2d at 883.
80. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
81. 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (plurality opinion).
82. See W. LAFAVE, supra note 47 § 10.8, at 205.
83. Stark v. Perpich, 590 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Minn. 1984); State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45,
691 P.2d 1073 (1984); State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992 (1983);
Ingersoll v. Palmer, 175 Cal. App. 3d 1028, 221 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1985), vacated and review granted,
41 Cal. 3d 714, 715 P.2d 680, 224 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1986); State v. Jones, 483 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1986);
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the state's interest against the individual's privacy interest.8 4 The Bartley
court considered many factors before concluding that the roadblock was
constitutional. However, the court underemphasized some concerns that
seriously impact on the constitutionality of this specific roadblock.
The Bartley court's conclusion, concerning the importance of the
state's interest, is well supported and not controversial. Even courts that
have held drunk driving roadblocks unconstitutional have acknowledged
the great state interest involved.8 5 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
stated that a state's interest in ridding its roadways of drunk drivers is
included in the state's interest in highway safety. This important state
86
interest is thus entitled to great weight in the balancing equation.
The Bartley Roadblock Did Not Accomplish its Stated Purpose
The second factor in the balancing test, showing that the action accomplishes the public purpose, has not been met with the same unanimity by other courts. Some courts and commentators have argued that
roadblocks are not an effective means of apprehending intoxicated drivers. They point to the relatively low number of drunk drivers apprehended compared to the large number of cars stopped.8 7 However, while
State v. Golden, 171 Ga. App. 27, 318 S.E.2d 693 (1984); State v. Garcia, 500 N.E.2d 158 (Ind.
1986); State v. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Riley, 377 N.W.2d 242
(Iowa Ct. App. 1985); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174 (1983); Little v. State, 300 Md.
485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984); Commonwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81, 483 N.E.2d 1102 (1985);
Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.E.2d 349 (1983); State v. Muzik, 379
N.W.2d 599 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Koppel, 127 N.H. 286, 499 A.2d 977 (1985); State v.
Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 28, 493 A.2d 1271 (App. Div. 1985); State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575,
427 A.2d 131 (Law Div. 1980); People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 473 N.E.2d 1, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649
(1984); State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392 (S.D. 1976); Webb v. State, 695 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. Ct. App.
1985); State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562, 496 A.2d 442 (1985); Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 377
S.E.2d 273 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1464 (1986); Fury v. City of Seattle, 46 Wash. App. 110,
730 P.2d 62 (1986).
Cf United States v. Prichard, 645 F.2d 854 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981); State
v. Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d 314 (Iowa 1980); State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143 (Me. 1985); State v.
Goines, 16 Ohio App. 3d 168, 474 N.E.2d 1219 (1984); State v. Goehring, 374 N.W.2d 882 (N.D.
1985); State v. Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d 434, 706 P.2d 225 (1985).
84. See supra text accompanying note 68.
85. See State v. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1136 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (overruled in State v.
Garcia, 500 N.E.2d 158, 162-63 (Ind. 1986)); State v. Koppel, 127 N.H. 286, 292, 499 A.2d 977, 982
(1985); State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562, 564 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); Webb v. State, 695 S.W.2d 676,
681 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). See also supra note 1.
86. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979).
87. See Ekstrom, 136 Ariz. at 2, 663 P.2d at 993 (14 drunk drivers arrested out of 5,763 vehicles stopped); Jones v. State, 459 So. 2d 1068, 1079 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (5 or 6 drunk driving
arrests out of 100 to 200 cars stopped), aff'd, 483 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1986); McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d at
1137 (3 drunk driving arrests out of 115 cars stopped); Deskins, 234 Kan. at 544-46, 673 P.2d at
1186-87 (Prager, J., dissenting) (15 drunk drivers arrested out of 2000 to 3000 vehicles stopped);
Koppel, 127 N.H. at 288, 499 A.2d at 979 (18 drunk driving arrests out of 1680 vehicles stopped);
Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 25, at 638 n.195, 645, 652 n.244; Comment, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 813,
813 n.1 (1984). Seealso Trumble, 396 Mass. at 85, 483 N.E.2d at 1105 (8 drunk drivers out of 503
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these statistics show low apprehension rates, they are similar to those the
Supreme Court considered effective for the Border Patrol at fixed immigration checkpoints. s8
The Bartley court countered that effectiveness should also take into
account drunk drivers who were apprehended but would not have been
detected by less intrusive means.8 9 This argument is made stronger because statistics purporting to show the ineffectiveness of roadblocks ignore evidence that drunk driving roadblocks remove drivers from
roadways prior to their being detected using conventional methods. 90
However, without good evidence supporting the effectiveness of roadblocks in apprehending drunk drivers, the Supreme Court may not accept such roadblocks as constitutional because less intrusive methods
exist for detecting intoxicated drivers. 91
To sustain the roadblock, the Bartley court argued that drunk driving roadblocks accomplish the state's purpose by deterring drunks from
driving. While the court's "common sense" approach may be open to
attack since there are few if any statistics showing that roadblocks do in
fact deter drunk drivers, 92 many courts in other jurisdictions have recognized the deterrent effect of drunk driving roadblocks. 93 Furthermore, in
cars stopped); Scott, 63 N.Y.2d at 528 n.3, 473 N.E.2d at 5 n.3, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 653 n.3. But see
Garcia, 500 N.E.2d at 162 (7 drunk driving arrests out of approximately 100 cars stopped).
Seven drunk drivers were arrested at the Bartley roadblock but the court did not indicate how
many vehicles were stopped. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 279, 486 N.E.2d at 882. The Conway roadblocks
resulted in the arrest of six drunk drivers out of 582 vehicles stopped. People v. Conway, 135 Ill.
App. 3d 887, 889, 482 N.E.2d 437, 438 (1985).
A recent set of Chicago area roadblocks yielded I1 drunk drivers out of 1079 vehicles stopped.
Chi. Tribune, supra note 59, at cols. 3-4.
88. In Martinez-Fuerte,the Court cited statistics to demonstrate the effectiveness of the checkpoint. Border Patrol officers arrested 725 illegal aliens in 171 vehicles out of 146,000 vehicles passing through the checkpoint. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976). See also
W. LAFAVE, supra note 47 § 10.8, at 208.
Furthermore, although the Prouse Court held that "[t]he marginal contribution to roadway
safety" did not justify the seizure "of every vehicle on the roads," the later dicta in Prouse apparently
allows such seizures if police discretion is limited. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661-63 (1979).
With such discretion eliminated, Prousedoes not dictate that drunk driving roadblocks must be the
most effective method of apprehending intoxicated drivers.
89. See supra note 69.
90. See Koppel, 127 N.H. at 297, 499 A.2d at 985 (Souter, J.,dissenting) (state interest served
by detecting drunk drivers before they would be detected by conventional methods); Lowe, 230 Va.
at 352, 337 S.E.2d at 277 (drunk drivers arrested at the roadblock had lower blood alcohol levels
than those drunk drivers arrested following conventional identification).
91. Ekstrom, 136 Ariz. at 5, 663 P.2d at 996; Jones, 459 So. 2d at 1077; Deskins, 234 Kan. at
544, 673 P.2d at 1187 (Prager, J.,dissenting).
92. See Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 25, at 638-45.
93. State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. at 48-49, 691 P.2d at 1076-77; Palmer, 175 Cal. App. 3d
at 1040, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 666; Koppel, 127 N.H. at 293, 499 A.2d at 982; Scott, 63 N.Y.2d at 526-29,
473 N.E.2d at 4-6, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 652-54; Lowe, 230 Va. at 352-53, 337 S.E.2d at 277. See also
Little, 300 Md. at 505-06, 479 A.2d at 913; Nelson v. Lane County, 79 Or. App. 753, 772, 720 P.2d
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another context, the Supreme Court recognized the deterrent value of
checkpoints.

94

However, because the Bartley court relied on its "common sense" to
assume that the roadblock would in fact deter drunk drivers, the justices
did not consider two other vital factors which impact on the usefulness of
the roadblocks in keeping drunks off the road. The first factor which the
court did not weigh was whether the location of the roadblock was chosen according to statistics which indicated that drunk driving had previously been a problem in that area.9 5 Locating roadblocks in areas where
drunk driving has been a problem increases the probability of both de96
tecting and deterring drunk drivers.
Considering that one part of the Brown balancing test requires that
the state show that their actions accomplish the important public purpose, this lack of evidence, that the roadblock was located based on data
indicating drunk driving problems in the past, weighs against many of
the state's arguments. Lack of a rational explanation for why the roadblock was placed in a specific location decreases any argument of actual
effectiveness of the roadblock. 97 Furthermore, the lack of standards to
guide supervisory personnel on where to locate the roadblocks distinguishes the Bartley roadblock from the fixed checkpoints in MartinezFuerte which the Supreme Court determined were reasonably located to
98
accomplish the public purpose.
Six months prior to Bartley, a New Jersey appellate court considered this same issue in State v. Kirk.99 After reviewing prior state decisions, the Kirk court concluded that a major factor required to sustain
drunk driving roadblocks was whether the roadblocks were established
1291, 1303, appeal granted, 301 Or. 765, 726 P.2d 377 (1986) (Richardson, P.J., specially concurring); W. LAFAVE, supra note 47 § 10.8, at 208-09; cf Note, supra note 1, at 1471-72.
The Little court detailed evidence of the deterrent effect of the roadblocks such as increased taxi
business from drunks, intoxicated individuals asking others to drive, and increased chartered transportation operations. Little, 300 Md. at 505-06, 479 A.2d at 913.
94. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976).
95. The court discussed the lack of statistics in the context of whether drunk driving was a
problem in Illinois and Macomb. See supra note 69.
96. State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 582, 427 A.2d 131, 134-35 (Law Div. 1980).
97. Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 25, at 671; Note, supra note 1, at 1472; cf Stark v. Perpich,
590 F. Supp. 1057, 1060 (D. Minn. 1984) (statistics insure against racial, ethnic, or economic discrimination in the location of the roadblock).
98. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 559 n.13, 562 n.15. Although the Court stated that the locations of the immigration checkpoints should be left to the Border Patrol's discretion, the Court also
stated that this discretion was to be guided by regulations and statutes. Id. at 559 n. 13. The Court
also noted that the location, at or near major roads leaving the Mexican border, was reasonable. Id.
at 562 n. 15. In contrast, the state presented no evidence to the Bartley court of what criteria were
used to decide on the roadblock location.
99. 202 N.J. Super. 28, 493 A.2d 1271 (App. Div. 1985).
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based on data that the location and time was likely to deter and detect
drunk drivers. 1°° The Kirk court noted that courts had upheld roadblocks where the locations were supported by "empirical data." Conversely, courts would declare roadblocks unconstitutional where the
location was not based on "'standards

. . . with regard to time [and]

place.' "101 With the notable exception of Bartley, this trend has continued in decisions subsequent to Kirk. 0 2 The lack of evidence that the
location and time of the roadblock was selected based on data showing
past alcohol related traffic problems, therefore, should result in the road03
block being unconstitutional.
The Illinois Supreme Court discussed the second vital factor, the
lack of advanced publicity, but included this factor in the concerns of the
subjective intrusiveness of the seizure. The court should also have considered how the lack of advanced publicity effected the deterrence and
thus the ability of the roadblock to accomplish its purpose.' °4 Other
100. Id. at 40-41, 493 A.2d at 1277.
101. Id. at 44, 493 A.2d at 1280. For cases discussed by the Kirk court where the state provided
information about the location and time of the roadblock see State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45,
48-49, 691 P.2d 1073, 1076-77 (1984) (statistics showing sites having a high percentage of drunk
driving accidents); State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 582, 427 A.2d 131, 134 (Law Div. 1980)
(roadblock location based on "empirical data" where most fatal accidents involved drunk drivers);
People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 523, 473 N.E.2d 1, 2, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649, 650 (1984) (checkpoints set
up at "high accident locations" and at times of "greatest risk"). See also Little v. State, 300 Md. 485,
490, 479 A.2d 903, 905 (1984) (locations determined from data on "alcohol related accident rates");
cf State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143, 144 (Me. 1985) (safety check roadblock located on basis of past
high accident rate).
For cases discussed by the Kirk court where the state provided no such information see State ex
rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 9, 663 P.2d 992, 1000 (1983) (Feldman, J., concurring)
(location not based on "standards . . . with regard to time and place"); State v. McLaughlin, 471
N.E.2d 1125, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (state could not show a reasonable relationship between the
roadblock location and its effectiveness).
102. For cases where courts found roadblocks constitutional see Ingersoll v. Palmer, 175 Cal.
App. 3d 1028, 1031-32, 221 Cal. Rptr. 659, 660 (1985) (location chosen based on "street layout,
traffic patterns, and frequency of drunk driving arrests"), vacated and review granted,41 Cal. 3d 714,
715 P.2d 680, 224 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1986); State v. Garcia, 500 N.E.2d 158, 160 (Ind. 1986) (location
chosen due to large number of alcohol related accidents); Commonwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81,
84, 483 N.E.2d 1102, 1104 (1985) (large number of fatal accidents and drunk driving arrests at
roadblock location); Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 351, 337 S.E.2d 273, 276 (1985) (checkpoints located based on analysis of sites of "drunk-driving arrests and alcohol-related accidents"),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1464 (1986).
But see State v. Riley, 377 N.W.2d 242, 243 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (roadblock location and time
selected by supervisory officer but no justification discussed in case for decision).
For post-Kirk cases where the courts found roadblocks unconstitutional see State v. Muzik, 379
N.W.2d 599, 604 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) ("insufficient evidence that roadblock site was rationally
selected"); State v. Koppel, 127 N.H. 286, 288, 499 A.2d 977, 979 (1985) (locations chosen based on
accident data and drunk driving arrests); Webb v. State, 695 S.W.2d 676, 681 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985)
(no statistics in the record showing degree of drunk driving problem at roadblock location).
103. The conclusion from these cases is that a rational explanation for the location and time of
the roadblock is a necessary but not sufficient condition for constitutionality.
104. In fact, the court noted that advanced publicity increases the deterrent effects of roadblocks. Bartley, 109 Il1. 2d at 291-92, 486 N.E.2d at 888. See also Note, supra note 1, at 1472 n.104.
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courts have analyzed the importance of advanced publicity in deterring
drunk drivers10 5 and in Ingersoll v. Palmer,0 6 a California appellate
court has gone so far as to state "advance publicity is absolutely essential
to the establishment of a constitutionally permissible roadblock."' 10 7
In another case decided shortly after Bartley, State v. Muzik, 0 8 the
Minnesota Court of Appeals theorized that where a roadblock was not
accompanied by advanced publicity, courts required the state to show
that the roadblock was more effective at detecting drunk drivers than less
intrusive conventional means.' 0 9 However, the court stated that when a
roadblock was preceded by advanced publicity, the deterrent value was
greater, and therefore, the state no longer would be required to show that
roadblocks are more effective than conventional methods. 0 Under this
theory, because the Illinois Supreme Court emphasized the deterrent
value of the roadblocks, the court should have required advanced publicity for the procedure to be constitutional. The Bartley roadblock, therefore, had sufficient deficiencies in showing that the state's interest was
accomplished so that the court should have found the procedures unconstitutional without considering the third prong of the balancing test.
Detailed Instructions on Procedures After the Cars Were Stopped
Should Be Required
The last part of the balancing test considers the intrusion on the
motorists who were stopped at the roadblock. The court found the intrusion to be minimal. Clearly, any objective intrusion-caused by the short
stop, the questions, and the shining of flashlights into the car-was no
greater than that experienced by motorists in Texas v. Brown."'
105. See State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 10, 663 P.2d 992, 1001 (Feldman, J.,
concurring); Deskins, 234 Kan. at 538, 673 P.2d at 1182. See also State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz.
at 49, 691 P.2d at 1077; Koppel, 127 N.H. at 293, 499 A.2d at 983; Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 58, 493
A.2d at 1288.
For additional cases where roadblocks were preceded by widescale publicity see Palmer, 175
Cal. App. 3d at 1032, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 660, Trumble, 396 Mass. at 85, 483 N.E.2d at 1105; Lowe v.
Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 352, 337 S.E.2d 273, 277 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1464 (1986).
The Trumble court, although asked by a lower court to decide whether advanced publicity was
required, refused to address the issue. Trumble, 396 Mass. at 91, 483 N.E.2d at 1108.
106. 175 Cal. App. 3d 1028, 221 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1985), vacated and review granted, 41 Cal. 3d
714, 715 P.2d 680, 224 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1986).
107. Id. at 1046, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 669-70.
108. 379 N.W.2d 599 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
109. Id. at 603 n.2.
110. Id.
111. 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (plurality opinion). See text accompanying note 39. The Brown plurality specifically stated that the use of a flashlight to look in the car "trenched upon no right secured
•..by the Fourth Amendment." Brown, 460 U.S. at 740 (opinion of Rehnquist, J.). Three concurring justices agreed. See id. at 750 (Stevens, J., concurring). The Palmer court similarly found no
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Although the intrusion in drunk driving roadblocks is slightly greater
than at immigration checkpoints where not all motorists are questioned,
after Brown, and the dicta in Prouse suggesting such stops could be constitutional, the Supreme Court would not likely object to the roadblocks
on the basis of objective intrusion.
The question of subjective intrusiveness, however, is different.
There is no question that the Bartley roadblock overcame the minimum
Prouse hurdle of eliminating discretion by officers in the field concerning
which cars to stop."

2

The roadblock was planned by supervisory per-

sonnel and overcame a presumption of arbitrariness on the part of the
police." 3 However, these factors only apply in Bartley to the decisions
of setting up the roadblock and stopping the cars.
Arbitrariness can still occur after the initial contact between the police and the motorist. The issue was not addressed by the Prouse Court
because the issue in Prouse was only whether the initial stop was valid.
However, the Court considered the impact of police decisions to further
examine automobile occupants in Martinez-Fuerte. The Martinez-Fuerte
majority indicated that although the Border Patrol required discretion on
which motorists to select for further questioning, the officers were trained
in various factors to identify illegal aliens. " 4 The Court emphasized that
these factors were "relevant" to the purpose of the checkpoint. 1 In
contrast, the officers manning the Bartley roadblock did not receive detailed instruction in the relevant factors to look for to identify drunk
drivers. Lack of guidance opens the door to police arbitrariness in deciding against whom to administer sobriety tests.
The Illinois court, however, did not consider the lack of guidance to
field officers on how to identify drunk drivers critical. 16 This lack of
direction is contrary to the requirements of the fourth amendment which
mandates neutral principles to constrain police discretion." 17 If the concern is to minimize the intrusiveness on motorists by constraining the
discretion of the police, detailed guidelines for identifying drunk drivers
should be available to the officers in the field. Indeed, other state courts
have included this factor as part of their analysis in approving roadconstitutional problem with shining a flashlight into the car to look for open bottles of alcohol.
Palmer, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 1032, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
112. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979).
113. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559.
114. Id. at 563 n.16, 564 & n.17.
115. Id. at 564 n.17. Furthermore, the more detailed questioning only involved requests for
proof of citizenship and questions about the occupants' citizenship, and was thus a minor intrusion.

Id. at 563-64.
116. See supra note 76.
117. See supra text accompanying note 13.
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blocks." 18 The New York Court of Appeals, in People v. Scott, 1 9 went
further and qualified its holding to cases where the police discretion in
identifying drunk drivers was restricted by written procedures. 120 The
excessive discretion granted to the field officers in Bartley should have led
the Illinois Supreme Court to strike down this roadblock as
unconstitutional.
A final factor that was lacking in the Bartley roadblock and thus
increased the subjective intrusiveness on motorists was the lack of advanced warning or publicity. Although as the Bartley court stated, advanced publicity may not be constitutionally required to reduce the
subjective intrusiveness,1 2' the Bartley roadblock lacked even a minimal
amount of advanced warning to motorists on the purpose of the roadblock. 22 While the court rejected the claim that subjective apprehension
is increased by not knowing the reason for the stop, other courts have
considered some sort of advanced warning significant.1 23

118. State v. Jones, 483 So. 2d 433, 438 (Fla. 1986); Little, 300 Md. at 491, 479 A.2d at 906;
Trumble, 396 Mass. at 90-91, 93, 483 N.E.2d at 1108-10; Scott, 63 N.Y.2d at 526, 473 N.E.2d at 4,
483 N.Y.S.2d at 652; Nelson v. Lane County, 79 Or. App. 753, 764, 720 P.2d 1291, 1298, appeal
granted,301 Or. 765, 726 P.2d 377 (1986); Lowe, 230 Va. at 351, 337 S.E.2d at 277. See also State v.
Superior Court, 143 Ariz. at 47, 691 P.2d at 1075; Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 25, at 673 n.318; W.
LAFAVE, supra note 47 § 10.8, at 212.
As an example, the memorandum from the Genesee County Sheriff issued prior to the Scott
roadblock specified:
the nature of the inquiries to be made [after stopping all vehicles and gave] specific direction that unless the operator's appearance and demeanor gave cause to believe him or her
intoxicated sobriety test[s were] not to be given. [The memorandum] listed the factors to
be considered and stated that neither the odor of alcohol alone nor any one of the listed
factors would suffice as a basis for sobriety tests.
Scott, 63 N.Y.2d at 523, 473 N.E.2d at 2, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 650-51.
Some of the indicia of intoxication that the arresting officer observed prior to asking the defendant if he had been drinking were fumbling with a wallet while producing the requested documents,
bloodshot and watery eyes, and a "strong odor of alcohol." Id. at 523, 473 N.E.2d at 2, 483
N.Y.S.2d at 650.
The instructions issued to the officers in the Little roadblock listed several factors to be used to
identify drunk drivers including: " 'an odor of alcoholic beverage about the driver, slurred speech,
the general appearance, and/or other behavior normally associated with D.W.I. violators.' " Little,
300 Md. at 491, 479 A.2d at 906. See also Palmer, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 1045, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 669.
119. 63 N.Y.2d 518, 473 N.E.2d 1, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1984).
120. The Scott court qualified its holding to cases where "operating personnel are prohibited
from administering sobriety tests unless they observe listed criteria, indicative of intoxication, which
give substantial cause to believe that the operator is intoxicated." Id. at 522, 473 N.E.2d at 2, 483
N.Y.S.2d at 650.
121. Bartley, 109 I11.2d at 292, 486 N.E.2d at 888. See also State v. Muzik, 379 N.W.2d 599
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985). The Muzik court stated that while advanced publicity might not be required
to reduce the subjective intrusion on motorists, the existence of advanced publicity could effect the
state's burden of showing that the roadblock accomplished the public interest. Id. at 604 n.4.
122. In fact, the motorists were not told that they entered a drunk driving checkpoint because
the roadblock was supposedly set up as a license checkpoint. Bartley, 109 II1. 2d at 292, 486 N.E.2d
at 888-89. See also Ekstrom, 136 Ariz. at 9, 663 P.2d at 1000 (Feldman, J., concurring).
123. State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. at 49, 691 P.2d at 1077 (sobriety check sign at least 100
feet before stop); Palmer, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 1032, 1045-46, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 660, 669-70 (several
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The Bartley court should have required at least warning signs in
advance of the roadblocks announcing a sobriety checkpoint. This
would have reduced the apprehension of the vast majority of motorists
who were not intoxicated and thus would have had no reason to fear a
drunk driving checkpoint.1 24 Furthermore, the more advanced warning
or publicity the state gives, the more the temporary roadblock resembles
the constitutionally permissible fixed checkpoint and the less it looks like
' 25
the unconstitutionally proscribed "roving patrol."'
CONCLUSION

The Illinois Supreme Court found that a roadblock set up to check
for drunk drivers was constitutional. The court balanced the state's interest in detecting and deterring drunk drivers against individuals' interests to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and determined
that the roadblock seizure was reasonable. However, the court did not
require evidence showing that the location of the roadblock would be
effective in detecting or deterring drunk drivers, nor did the court require
advanced publicity of roadblocks to insure their deterrent value. Finally,
the court did not require detailed guidelines so that the officers manning
the roadblock could determine which drivers to investigate further. This
excessive discretion is contrary to Supreme Court and constitutional requirements. In addition, the court did not require advanced warning of
the roadblock in the form of signs to limit its subjective intrusiveness on
the motorists.
In view of these three major deficiencies, the court should have declared this particular roadblock unconstitutional. However, with the additional safeguards, roadblocks to detect and deter drunk driving should
warning signs including one identifying roadblock as a sobriety checkpoint); Little, 300 Md. at 506,
479 A.2d at 913 (sobriety check sign 200 to 300 feet before checkpoint); Trumble, 396 Mass. at 90,
483 N.E.2d at 1108 (roadblock sign 500 feet before stop); Scott, 63 N.Y.2d at 526, 473 N.E.2d at 4,
483 N.Y.S.2d at 652 (warning signs 300 feet prior to checkpoint).
124. State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. at 49, 691 P.2d at 1077; Ekstrom, 136 Ariz. at 10, 663
P.2d at 1001 (Feldman, J.,concurring); Jones v. State, 459 So. 2d 1068, 1076 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984), aff'd, 483 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1986).
125. See Jones, 459 So. 2d at 1076 (advanced publicity "provide[s] a meaningful substitute for
the type of permanency... of the roadblock in Martinez-Fuerte"). However, in affirming the appellate court, the Florida Supreme Court disagreed that advanced publicity was required. State v.
Jones, 483 So. 2d 433, 439 (Fla. 1986).
The advanced publicity should not require the state to announce the exact location of the checkpoints. This would have the undesirable effect of reducing the deterrent value of the roadblock by
allowing drunk drivers to plan alternate routes. See State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. at 49, 691
P.2d at 1077; Palmer, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 1046, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 670; Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 143, 449 N.E.2d 349, 353 (1983); Scott, 63 N.Y.2d at 528, 473 N.E.2d at 2,
483 N.Y.S.2d at 650; State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562, 575, 496 A.2d 442, 450 (1985); W. LAFAVE,
supra note 47 § 10.8, at 213-14; cf Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 25, at 672 n.314.
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not violate citizens' rights to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.
STEVEN

T. NAUMANN

